
I am a philosopher working at the intersection between the philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind. My current research focuses on the functional roles of representational formats in cognition, especially their involvement in the elicitation and regulation of affect.
I am currently a postdoctoral researcher in the LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Before that, I held a joint postdoctoral position between the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp and the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences (CISA).
I earned my Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Barcelona in 2022. Prior to that, I completed a Master’s in Analytic Philosophy and a B.A. in Philosophy at the University of Barcelona, as well as a B.S. in Psychology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
When I’m not doing philosophy, I spend my time on the things that make life enjoyable—loose conversation being the main one, but also exploring new places, eating delicious things, watching movies and art in good company, and reading literature (modernism!).

Evidence from clinical and experimental psychology shows that imagination influences attitudes and behavior in ways similar to perceptual experiences—calling for an architectural explanation. I propose that perceptual imaginings possess implicit assertoric force and advance a theory—the Prima Facie View—as a unified explanation of the empirical findings reviewed. According to this view, given the source indifference of several associative processes, mental images are treated as percepts in operations involving associative memory. As a result, imaginings can both trigger and interfere with associations, shaping emotions, behaviors, and attitudes toward their real-world counterparts—even in the absence of reality-monitoring errors.
The Prima Facie View:
More on perceptual imagination, this time in connection with episodic memory:

A large body of evidence shows that probabilistic information, large numerical counts, and intentions are frequently disregarded in the elicitation and regulation of emotion. Yet no existing theory has explained why these features are systematically neglected. To offer a unified account of a well-documented set of phenomena, I have developed the Iconic Prioritization Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, emotions prioritize inputs encoded in the iconic format, and this prioritization explains the neglect of information that remains representationally silent—that is, not explicitly encoded—in such a format. The prioritization of the iconic format in emotion—and the ensuing “silencing” of certain information—offers a systematic explanation of how emotions can influence judgments and choices in suboptimal ways, bringing coherence to a range of previously disconnected findings.
Paper where I formulate the Iconic Prioritization Hypothesis:
Secondly, my research aims to uncover the representational format of emotions. Computational approaches in cognitive science have long investigated the representational formats underlying perception, thought, and action. Yet they have largely overlooked a crucial question: what is the representational format of emotion? My research program seeks to fill this gap by investigating how emotions are represented—how their contents are structured, which kinds of information they are sensitive to, and how they interact with other mental states given their representational architecture. By identifying the representational format of emotion, I aim to provide a unified framework for understanding the interaction between affect and cognition.
Draft "Format and Emotion", in preparation.

The mind harbors a vast array of information of diverse origins, making it challenging to assess its epistemic status. Given these limitations, it is reasonable to think that beyond a thorough and sophisticated pondering about the evidential status of contents, the mind possesses automatic criteria for ranking the evidential status of the contents it entertains. In this project I develop the hypothesis that a primary cue for judging the epistemic pedigree of content is the format in which it is entertained. More specifically, I argue that empirical evidence supports the view that the iconic format is treated as having a higher epistemic pedigree in cognition than information entertained discursively. Given that the iconic format is that of perceptual experience, this format is associated with firsthandness and reliable belief formation, being automatically used as a cue for content lineage. This hypothesis explains a vast array of cases in which mental imagery has stronger causal powers than those entertained discursively, even when this is not justified from a normative stance.
Draft "Iconicity as Epistemic Pedigree: Format as a cue for content lineage", available.

Thought may be seen as an unceasing parade of contents whose transitions are set in motion by shifting cognitive goals. Often, this parade follows well-worn routes: inferential transitions unfold according to logical rules, memories are triggered, and perceptual simulations take shape by mimicking prior experiences. But every so often, the parade breaks formation. A thought swerves—less constrained by rules and past experience—and opens a new space. Intuitively, such leaps form a core part of creative thought. But what distinguishes a creative transition from other kinds of transitions in thought? Drawing on accounts of inferential and associative transitions (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum, 2018; 2019, Shea 2024), this paper addresses the following question: given a particular input or initial state, what features of the ensuing transition make it creative? In other words, what cognitive operations both underlie and enable such creative leaps?
Draft "Creative Transitions" available.
3rd November 2025. "Creative Transitions" University of Toronto. Invided
5th November 2025: “Iconicity as epistemic pedigree” Queen’s University (Kingston, Canada) Invited
9/25: “Hearing what we’d like to hear: The prima facie view of indirect self-talk”
Department of Humanities, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) Invited
9/25: “Creative Transitions” European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP 2025), University of Warsaw.
6/25: “Creative Transitions” Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP 2025), Cornell University.
5/25: “Iconicity as epistemic pedigree” Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. Invited
5/25: “Creative transitions” Conference on Creativity, agency, and value, University of Geneva. Invited
3/25: “Creative transitions” Workshop on Creativity, Imagination and Artificial Intelligence, Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris. Invited
7/24: “Iconicity and Representational Silence in emotion” Cognitive Science 2024: Dynamics of Cognition, Rotterdam. (poster)
5/24: “Iconicity as epistemic pedigree” Conference on Mental Imagery, University of Antwerp.
7/23: “Emotion, Iconicity, and the function of episodic memory”. Bochum-Grenoble Memory Colloquium, University of Bochum. Invited
10/23: “The Prima Facie View of experiential imagination” Thumos Seminar, University of Geneva. Invited
8/23: “Iconicity and Representational Silence in emotion” European Society for Philosophical Psychology, University of Prague. (poster)
8/22: “Experiential imagination and associative memory: Introducing the Prima Facie System” Issues in Philosophy of Memory III, Duke University.
7/22: “The Asymmetry Problem and the Episodic Constructive System.” Simulationism, Centre for Philosophy of Memory, University of Grenoble. Invited
7/22: “The Prima Facie View of Experiential Imagination” 3rd joint Conference of the SPP and ESPP, University of Milan.
4/22: “The Prima Facie View of Experiential Imagination.” CPM Internal Seminar, University of Grenoble.
1/22: “Perceptual imagination and the intuitive system” Sloman Lab, Brown University.
12/21:“Are the phenomenology of memory and the phenomenology of imagination mutually exclusive?”Remembering, phenomenological and Analytic Approaches, University of Grenoble.
9/21: “On storing and retrieving experiential imaginings” The Science and Philosophy of Imagination, University of Bristol.
7/21: “On storing and retrieving experiential imaginings” Issues in Philosophy of Memory 2,5, Centre for philosophy of memory, University of Grenoble.
10/20: “Can fragmentationism help a doxastic account of delusions?” PLM Workshop on delusions in Language and Mind, University of Amsterdam.
7/19: “Episodic memory as experiential imagination: A comparison between Hopkin’s Inclusion View and Michaelian’s Simulation theory.” Issues in Philosophy of Memory II, Centre for philosophy of memory, University of Grenoble.
Teaching is for me, first and foremost, about sharing enthusiasm. The excitement I feel for philosophy and for understanding the human mind naturally transpires when I teach, and I believe in the idea that when one embraces enthusiasm, one spreads it. This spirit shapes the classroom atmosphere I aim to cultivate—one where curiosity, rigor, and enjoyment go hand in hand. Philosophy of psychology and cognitive science are at their best when they challenge us to question assumptions, examine methods, and think critically about the relation between theory and evidence. For this reason, I encourage students to develop their own voice and to recognize the complexity inherent in these fields. My ultimate goal is not only for students to master content but for them to leave my courses with a lasting enthusiasm for questioning, reasoning, and discovery.
Teaching experience: List of Courses
2025-2026: Research Methods in Analytic Philosophy. Course design and Primary Intructor. Master’s program in Analytic Philosophy (Aphil), Universitat de Barcelona.
2020-2021: Philosophy of language I, Philosophy of language II and Epistemology I, Teaching assistant. Universitat de Barcelona.
2019-2020: Epistemology II and Philosophy of language II. Teaching assistant. Universitat de Barcelona.
2018-2019: Philosophy of language II. Teaching assistant. Universitat de Barcelona.


Please don’t hesitate to get in touch with questions, feedback, or requests for
drafts. I’d be happy to hear from you!
Andrea Rivadulla Duró